

Approved For Release 2008/07/25 : CIA-RDP85B00652R000100060016-2

Page Denied

Approved For Release 2008/07/25 : CIA-RDP85B00652R000100060016-2

SECRET

DDI CHRONO
Q 7 JUNE 83

4 November 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard J. Kerr, ADDI

THROUGH : Douglas J. MacEachin, D/CPAS

FROM : [REDACTED] DD/CPAS

SUBJECT : NID Dissemination to the Commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

25X1

1. Ken Cohen, formerly an NRC intelligence staffer and now an assistant to one of the commissioners, raised the issue of all-source NID dissemination to the NRC with me last week. The NRC Commissioners (5) evidently are pressing hard to receive the all-source NID because much of the nuclear intelligence that they use does not appear in the NID cable they now receive. The Chairman received the all-source NID in 1979-80, but I have not been able to determine why it was stopped. It may have been a personal service to the Chairman that was stopped when he left. The NRC's charter includes nuclear export control under provisions of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978. An MOU [REDACTED] covering NRC access to finished and raw intelligence was signed this past summer but it does not cover the NID specifically.

25X1
25X1

2. Although much that is in the NID is not germane to the NRC's needs, the political and military situations in countries of nuclear proliferation or nuclear export concern as well as all nuclear items are germane. This would cover much third world reporting. Evidently, the Commissioners' major concern is that they will miss out on a late-breaking piece of current intelligence that could affect some sensitive export decision that they were about to make. This has happened to them on several occasions (most recently on India) and the procedures in the MOU will not necessarily prevent it from happening in the future (nor will the NID for that matter).

3. From a security perspective the NRC has been very good at protecting intelligence information and is by no means a "leaker." On the other hand, the State Department has traditionally tried to limit NRC access to the intelligence community, (particularly unevaluated intelligence) but the NID would not allow them access to information they would not eventually get through the MOU process. The Commissioners are located in downtown Washington but the NRC's only [REDACTED] storage facility is in Silver Spring. Thus the NID would have to be delivered there and carried back and forth by NRC couriers. They expect to eventually have [REDACTED] storage available downtown.

25X1

25X1

SECRET

4. Since much of the current nuclear intelligence of interest to the NRC is [REDACTED] I recommend that we resume dissemination of the all-source NID to the NRC Commissioners. I also recommend that we limit the access as spelled out in paragraph 6 of the MOU, namely "NRC Commissioners and limited EDO (Executive Director of Operations) Staff Eyes Only." The NID cable would continue to be disseminated as now.

25X1

25X1

25X1

cc: C/PDG/CPAS

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

SUBJECT: NID Dissemination to the Commissioners of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- 1 - ADDI
- 1 - DDI Registry
- 1 - OD/CPAS
- 1 - C/PDG/CPAS

SECRET